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Abstract
This paper has two aims. First, it points out a crucial difference between the standard
argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse and paradigmatic instances of anthropic
reasoning. The former treats the life-friendliness of our universe as the evidence whose
impact is assessed, whereas the latter treat the life-friendliness of our universe as back-
ground information. Second, the paper develops a new fine-tuning argument for the
multiverse which, unlike the old one, parallels the structure of paradigmatic instances
of anthropic reasoning. The main advantage of the new argument is that it is not
susceptible to the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge.
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1 Introduction
The fact that the universe supports life seems to depend delicately on various of its
fundamental characteristics, notably on the form of the laws of nature, on the values of
some constants of nature, and on aspects of the universe’s conditions in its very early
stages. An example of such fine-tuning for life is the difference between the masses
of the two lightest quarks: the up- and down-quark [1,2], [3, Sect. 4]. Small changes
in this difference would undermine the stability properties of the proton and neutron,
which are bound states of these quarks, and lead to a much less complex universe
where bound states of quarks other than the proton and neutron dominate.
Life would apparently also have been impossible if the mass of the electron, which
is roughly ten times smaller than the mass difference between the down- and the
up-quark, had been somewhat larger in relation to that difference. Fine-tuning of the
lightest quark masses with respect to the strength of the weak nuclear force has been
found as well [4]. Further suggested instances of fine-tuning concern the strength of
gravity, the strengths of the strong and weak nuclear forces, the mass of the Higgs
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boson, the vacuum energy density, the total energy density of the universe in its very
early stages, the relative amplitude of energy density fluctuations in the very early
universe, the initial entropy of the universe, and aspects of the very form of the known
laws of nature. (See [5,6], [7, Sect. 1]) for some overviews.) It should be noted that
some expert physicists—e.g. [8]—question some of the popular fine-tuning claims.
The present paper operates under the assumption that at least some laws and constants
are indeed fine-tuned for life in the sense just sketched. (For up-to-date defences of
this assumption, see [9,10].)
One of the most popular and most discussed responses to the universe’s fine-tuning
for life is to suggest that the laws and constants might be environmental, i.e. that they
might differ in different regions of space-time (see [11] for a review of the evidence)
and/or in different spatio-temporally disconnected universes. A collection of multiple
universes with different constants and laws is commonly referred to as a “multiverse.”
Since the version of the idea that the laws and constants are environmental that is
most often discussed is the multiverse idea, I will simply use the term “multiverse”
here when referring to any hypothesis according to which the laws and constants
are environmental. The most intensely discussed concrete multiverse scenario is the
landscape multiverse [12], which is taken to be suggested by a combination of string
theory (see [13] for a comprehensive discussion of philosophical issues) and eternal
inflation [14].
The idea that underlies the suggested inference from the finding that life requires
fine-tuned laws and constants to a multiverse is that, if there is a sufficiently vast and
diverse multiverse, it is only to be expected that it contains at least one universe where
the laws and constants are right for life. The famous (weak) anthropic principle states
that “we must be prepared to take account of the fact that our location [. . .] is necessar-
ily privileged to the extent of being compatible with our existence as observers” [15, p.
293] emphasis due to Carter). As this principle highlights, given that we are observers,
the universe (or space–time region) in which we find ourselves has to be one where the
conditions are compatible with the existence of observers. This suggests that, on the
assumption that there is a sufficiently diverse multiverse, it is neither surprising that
there is at least one universe that is hospitable to life nor—since we could not have
found ourselves in a life-hostile universe—that we find ourselves in a life-friendly one.
Many physicists (e.g. [12,16,17]) and philosophers (e.g. [18–20]) regard this line of
thought as suggesting the inference to a multiverse as a rational response to the finding
that the conditions are right for life in our universe despite the required fine-tuning.
The most prominent objection against the inference from fine-tuning to a multiverse
[21,22] is that it commits the inverse gambler’s fallacy [23].
The aims of this paper are twofold. First, I point out that the argument from fine-
tuning for the multiverse in its standard version, as just sketched, differs crucially
from paradigmatic instances of anthropic reasoning such as, notably, Dicke’s [24]
and Carter’s [15] accounts of coincidences between large numbers in cosmology. The
key difference is that the standard fine-tuning argument for the multiverse treats the
existence of observers as calling for a response and suggests to infer the existence of
a multiverse as the best such response. Anthropic reasoning of the type championed
by Dicke and Carter, in contrast, assumes the existence of observers as background
knowledge when assessing whether the large number coincidences are to be expected
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given the competing theories. These are clearly different argumentative strategies,
which should not be confused.
The second aim of this paper is to explore a novel fine-tuning argument for the
multiverse, which, unlike the old one, partly mirrors the structure of Dicke’s and
Carter’s accounts of large number coincidences. The new argument turns out to have
the virtue of being immune to the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge. As will become
clear, it rests on one key assumption, namely, that the considerations according to
which life requires fine-tuned laws and constants do not independently make it less
attractive to believe in a multiverse.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 reviews the old fine-
tuning argument for the multiverse and the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge. Section 3
turns to a classic instance of anthropic reasoning and shows how it structurally dif-
fers from the old fine-tuning argument for the multiverse. Section 4 introduces the
new fine-tuning argument for the multiverse. Section 5 concludes the paper by high-
lighting the most significant attraction and the most significant limitation of the new
argument.
2 The Old Fine-Tuning Argument for theMultiverse
The old argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse is usually presented in Bayesian
terms, using subjective probability assignments. In a simple exposition, probability
assignments which are aimed at being reasonable are compared for a general single-
universe theory TU and a multiverse theory TM . One can think of TU as a disjunction
of specific single-universe theories T λU that differ on the value of some parameter λ
which collectively describes the (by assumption uniform) laws and constants in the
one universe. The multiverse theory TM should be thought of as entailing that the
laws and/or constants are different in the different universes (or regions) that exist
according to TM and scan over a wide range.
As the evidence whose impact is assessed the old argument uses the proposition R
that there is (at least) one universe with the right laws and constants for life. Thus the
argument studies the impact of the finding that we are able to exist in that there is a
life-friendly universe against the backdrop of the insight that a life-friendly universe
requires delicate fine-tuning of the laws and constants. For the sake of perspicuity it
will be useful to explicitly include our background knowledge B0 in all formulas. The
prior probabilities assigned to TM and TU before taking into account R are written
as P(TM |B0) and P(TU |B0). It is extremely difficult to make well-motivated value
assignment to these quantities because they refer to the epistemic situation of an agent
who is unaware of R, i.e. unaware that there is a life-friendly universe. Concerns on
the possibility of rational probability assignments in this situation are articulated in
[25] and taken up in [26]. The posterior probabilities P+(TM ) and P+(TU ), in turn,
are supposed to reflect the rational credences of an agent who not only knows that a
life-friendly universe requires fine-tuning, but also knows R, i.e. that there is indeed
a life-friendly universe.
Updating of the probability assignments from the prior to the posterior probabilites
is done in accordance with Bayesian conditioning, where P+(H) = P(H |R, B0) for
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the posterior probabilites. For the ratio of the posteriors assigned to TM and TU we
obtain
P+(TM )
P+(TU )
= P(TM |R, B0)
P(TU |R, B0) =
P(R|TM , B0)
P(R|TU , B0)
P(TM |B0)
P(TU |B0) . (1)
If the multiverse according to TM is sufficiently vast and varied, life appears almost
unavoidably somewhere in it, so the conditional probability P(R|TM , B0) is very close
to 1:
P(R|TM , B0) ≈ 1. (2)
If we assume that, on the assumption that there is only a single universe, it is improbable
that it has the right conditions for life, the conditional prior P(R|TU , B0) will be much
smaller than 1:
P(R|TU , B0)  1 . (3)
Equation (3) is supposed to be the probabilistic implementation of the arguments
according to which life requires fine-tuned laws and constants.
Equations (2) and (3) together yield P(R|TM , B0)  P(R|TU , B0), which entails
P(R|TM , B0)/P(R|TU , B0)  1, i.e. a ratio of posteriors that is much larger than the
ratio of the priors:
P+(TM )
P+(TU )
= P(TM |R, B0)
P(TU |R, B0) 
P(TM |B0)
P(TU |B0) . (4)
So, unless we have very strong prior reasons to dramatically prefer a single universe
over the multiverse, i.e. unless P(TU |B0)  P(TM |B0), the ratio P+(TM )/P+(TU )
of the posteriors will be much larger than 1 and we can be rather confident that there
is a multiverse.
The most-discussed objection against this argument is that it commits the inverse
gambler’s fallacy, originally identified by Ian Hacking [23]. This fallacy consists in
inferring from an event with a remarkable outcome that there have likely been many
more events of the same type in the past, most with less remarkable outcomes. For
example, the inverse gambler’s fallacy is committed by someone who enters a casino
and, upon witnessing a remarkable outcome at the nearest table—say, a five-fold six
in a toss of five dice—concludes that the toss is most likely part of a large sequence of
tosses. This inference is fallacious if, as seems plausible, the outcomes of the tosses can
be assumed to be probabilistically independent. According to critics of the argument
from fine-tuning for the multiverse, the argument commits this fallacy by, as White
puts it, “supposing that the existence of many other universes makes it more likely
that this one—the only one that we have observed—will be life-permitting.” [21, p.
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263] Versions of this criticism are endorsed by Draper and Pust [27] and Landsman
[22].1
Adherents of the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge against the argument from fine-
tuning for the multiverse claim that it is misleading to focus on the impact of the
proposition R—that the conditions are right for life in some universe. As they highlight,
much closer to our full evidence is the more specific proposition H : that the conditions
are right for life here, in this universe. According to proponents of the inverse gambler’s
fallacy charge, if we replace R by H , the fine-tuning argument for the multiverse no
longer goes through because finding this universe to be life-friendly does not increase
the likelihood of there being any other universes.
Many philosophers defend the argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse against
the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge [20,28–32]. Notably, Bradley [20] discusses
a number of candidate casino analogies—among them one already suggested by
McGrath [28]—which, according to him, suggest that the inverse gambler’s fallacy
charge is to be rejected. However, Landsman [22] recently disputed Bradley’s analy-
sis, and the question of whether the fine-tuning argument for the multiverse is valid
or fallacious seems to be as controversial as ever. The present paper does not aim to
resolve this dispute.
3 Anthropic Reasoning: Dicke/Carter-Style
The argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse differs crucially from arguments
to which Carter [15] appeals as exemplary instances of anthropic reasoning, notably
astrophysicist Robert Dicke’s accounts of coincidences between large numbers in cos-
mology [24]. A prominent such coincidence concerns the fact that the relative strength
of electromagnetism and gravity as acting on an electron/proton pair is of roughly the
same order of magnitude (namely, 1040) as the age of the universe, measured in natural
units of atomic physics. Impressed by this and other coincidences with numbers of
similar size, Dirac had stipulated some decades earlier that they might hold universally
and as a matter of physical principle [33]. Based on this stipulation, Dirac had con-
jectured that the strength of gravity may decrease as the age of the universe increases,
which would be necessary for the large number coincidence to hold across all cosmic
times.
Dicke [24], criticizing Dirac, argues that standard cosmology with time-independent
gravity suffices to account for the coincidence, provided that we take into consideration
the fact that our existence is tied to the simultaneous presence of mainline stars like the
sun and various chemical elements produced in supernovae. As Dicke shows, given
this requirement, we could only have found ourselves in a cosmic period in which the
coincidence (approximately) holds. Accordingly, to make the coincidence unsurpris-
ing there is no need to assume that gravity varies with time. Carter [15] and Leslie [18,
Chap. 6] describe Dicke’s account as an “anthropic explanation” of the large number
coincidence, and Leslie discusses it continuously with the argument from fine-tuning
1 Somewhat curiously, Hacking [23] himself regards only those versions of the argument from fine-tuning
for the multiverse as guilty of the inverse gambler’s fallacy that infer the existence of multiple universes in
a temporal sequence.
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for the multiverse.2 But this is somewhat misleading: whereas Dicke’s account of the
large number coincidence uses life’s existence in our galaxy, in the present cosmic
era as background knowledge to show that standard cosmology suffices to make the
coincidence expected, the argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse treats life’s
existence as requiring a theoretical response and advocates the multiverse hypothesis
as the best such response.
To make Dicke’s reasoning more transparent using the Bayesian formalism, let us
denote by C the large number coincidence, by S the standard view according to which
gravity is spatio-temporally uniform and by A Dirac’s alternative theory according
to which the coincidence holds universally and gravity varies with time. Dirac’s idea
is that the approximate identity of the two apparently unrelated large number is a
surprising coincidence on the standard theory, whereas it is to be expected and not at
all surprising on the alternative theory. This suggests the inequality
P(C |S, B)  P(C |A, B) , (5)
where B stands for the assumed scientific background knowledge. Probabilities
assigned to S and A based on this background knowledge B prior to consider-
ing the impact of C will presumably privilege standard cosmology S over Dirac’s
alternative A:
P(S|B) > P(A|B) . (6)
By Bayes’ theorem, posterior probabilities P+(S) = P(S|C, B) and P+(A) =
P(A|C, B) can be computed which take into account the impact of C . In line with
Dirac’s argument, due to Eq. (5) and in spite of Eq. (6) they may end up privileging
Dirac’s alternative theory A over standard cosmology S.
Dicke’s considerations, however, reveal that considering Eq. (5) is not helpful.
Plausibly, our background knowledge B will include some basic information about
ourselves, including that we are forms of life whose existence depends on the presence
of a mainline star in the vicinity. But, according to standard physics, mainline stars
can exist only in that period of cosmic evolution where the coincidence approximately
holds, so it is misleading to consider only the evidential impact of C . What comes
closer to our full evidence is the proposition [C]: that that the coincidence holds here
and now, in our cosmic era. Dicke’s reasoning can be expressed as the insight that we
should use [C] rather C as our evidence and that, instead of a probability distribution
P that conforms to Eq. (5), we should use a probability distribution P ′ for which
P ′([C]|S, B) ≈ P ′([C]|A, B) . (7)
According to Eq. (7) it no longer seems that finding the coincidence C realized provides
any strong support for the alternative (varying gravity) theory A over the standard
theory S. Since Eq. (6) plausibly carries over from P( ) to P ′( ), we have
2 I leave it open here whether Dicke’s account really qualifies as a genuine scientific explanation of the
large number coincidence. See [34, p. 309] for the (plausible, I think) view that it should not be regarded
as such.
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P ′(S|B) > P ′(A|B). (8)
Combining Eqs. (7) and (8) and applying Bayes’ theorem means that the posteriors will
likely still privilege the standard theory over the alternative theory. This, in essence,
is Dicke’s conclusion, contra Dirac.
Whether one thinks Dicke’s reasoning is compelling or not, the key aspect of it
that matters for the purposes of this paper is that there is a key difference between this
type of anthropic reasoning and the standard fine-tuning argument for the multiverse as
reviewed in Sect. 2, namely, how they treat the information that the conditions are life-
friendly in our universe: Dicke/Carter-style reasoning uses it as part of the background
knowledge B, whereas the standard fine-tuning argument for the multiverse uses it
as the information whose evidential impact is assessed in the light of the fine-tuning
considerations, i.e. not as background knowledge. As we saw in Sect. 2, the stan-
dard fine-tuning argument for the multiverse is potentially susceptible to the inverse
gambler’s fallacy charge. The following section develops a new argument from fine-
tuning for life for a multiverse that parallels Dicke/Carter-style anthropic reasoning
inaasmuch as it treats the information that our universe is life-friendly as background
knowledge. This makes the new argument by construction immune against the inverse
gambler’s fallacy charge.
4 A New Fine-Tuning Argument for theMultiverse
The basic idea of the new fine-tuning argument for the multiverse is that the fine-tuning
considerations contribute to a partial erosion of the main theoretical advantage that
empirically adequate single-universe theories tend to have over empirically adequate
multiverse theories, namely, that their empirical consequences are far more specific.
In what follows I give an exposition of the new argument.
The new argument contrasts multiverse theories and single-universe theories with
respect to their abilities to account for the measured value of some numerical parameter
λ. The parameter λ can be thought of as collectively encoding relevant aspects of the
laws and constants.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that there is only one fundamental multiverse
theory TM worth taking seriously. This TM should be empirically adequate in the very
weak sense that it is compatible with the existence of at least some (sub-)universe
where the parameter λ has a value λ0 that is consistent with our measurements in this
universe. Next, I assume that, as the main rival to TM , there is only one candidate
fundamental single-universe theory T λ0U worth taking seriously. This should also be
empirically adequate, which means that the value λ0 that it ascribes to the parameter
λ over the entire universe must be one that our measurements in this universe are
consistent with.
Let us suppose now that λ is a parameter for which physicists come up with con-
siderations F according to which its value requires fine-tuning to be compatible with
life. Thus, only values very close to λ0 lead to a life-friendly universe. Do those con-
siderations F make it rational to increase one’s credence in the multiverse theory
TM ?
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To answer this question, let us first consider our evidential situation prior to taking
into account the considerations F according to which λ requires fine-tuning for life.
An evidential advantage that we can expect the single-universe theory T λ0U to have over
the multiverse TM is that it makes a highly specific and, as it turns out, empirically
adequate “prediction” of the value of λ. The multiverse theory TM , in contrast, entails
the existence of universes with many different values of λ. Observing any of those
values in our own universe would have been compatible with TM . This reflects the main
methodological drawback of multiverse theories, often emphasized by their critics, that
they tend to make few testable predictions, if any.
One can express this consideration in Bayesian terms, denoting by “[λ0]” the propo-
sition “The value of λ is λ0 in our own universe.” If T λ0U holds, finding the value of
λ to be λ0 is guaranteed, whereas if TM holds, finding λ0 is by no means guaranteed
because one might be in a sub-universe where the value of λ is different. So, in terms
of subjective probabilities and assuming that we have been able to specify suitable
background information Bl which includes that our universe is life-friendly but leaves
open the value of λ:
P([λ0]|TM , Bl) < P([λ0]|T λ0U , Bl) , (9)
with the inequality possibly being substantial.
It is interesting to note that TM may have comparative advantages over T λ0U that
allow it to partially compensate for the drawback encoded in Eq. (9), even before tak-
ing account of the fine-tuning considerations F : For many constants of fundamental
physics whose values are known by observation, physicists have not found any theo-
retical reason as to why the actual values might be somehow systematically preferred.
Notably, in the light of standard criteria of theory choice such as elegance, simplicity,
and “naturalness” (see [35] and [7, Sect. 5]) for introductions to the latter notion aimed
at philosophers) one would have expected at least some constants to have very differ-
ent values [36]. The single-universe theory T λ0U may therefore not rank very high in
the light of these theoretical virtues. One can imagine, in contrast, a multiverse theory
TM that is conceptually elegant and has only few, if any, systematically unconstrained
constants as input. In that scenario (which, however, is not required for the new fine-
tuning argument for the multiverse to go through) it may be plausible to assign a larger
prior to TM than to T λ0U :
P(TM |Bl) > P(T λ0U |Bl) . (10)
Due to Bayes’ theorem, the result of the competition between TM and T λ0U is encoded
in the ratio:
P(TM |[λ0], Bl)
P(T λ0U |[λ0], Bl)
= P([λ0]|TM , Bl)
P([λ0]|T λ0U , Bl)
· P(TM |Bl)
P(T λ0U |Bl)
. (11)
How the competition between TM and T λ0U plays out numerically will of course depend
on the specific empirical considerations based on which all the probabilities appearing
in Eqs. (9) and (10) are assigned.
Let us now turn to assessing the impact of the fine-tuning considerations F . These
considerations reveal, to recall, that the value of λ must be very close to λ0 for there
to be life. Thus they imply that our background knowledge Bl—which in analogy to
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Dicke/Carter-style reasoning now includes the proposition that our universe is life-
friendly—constrains values of λ that we could have possibly found to a very narrow
range around λ0. So, effectively, what the fine-tuning considerations show is that
based on Bl alone we could have predicted that we will find a value of λ that is (very
close to) λ0. Specifically, if there is a multiverse as entailed by TM , all life forms
in it that are capable of making measurements of λ will find values very close to
λ0. Using Bayesian language we can take this insight into account by reconsidering
the conditional probability of finding λ0 given TM in the light of the fine-tuning
considerations F and assign it a larger value than while F was still ignored. So,
plausibly, if we denote by “P F ([λ0]|TM , Bl)” the revised version of P([λ0]|TM , Bl),
now assigned in the light of the fine-tuning considerations F , we have
P F ([λ0]|TM , Bl) > P([λ0]|TM , Bl) . (12)
The notation “P F ([λ0]|TM , Bl)” is used instead of “P([λ0]|TM , Bl , F)” because it is
doubtful whether taking into account the fine-tuning considerations F can be modelled
by Bayesian conditioning. After all, considering F is not a matter of gaining any
new evidence but amounts to better understanding the empirical consequences of the
theories TM and TU , namely, that they are compatible with the existence of life only
for very specific configurations of the parameter λ.
In contrast, the conditional probabilities P F ([λ0]|T λ0U , Bl) and P([λ0]|T λ0U , Bl)
cannot possibly differ from each other as they are both 1. As a consequence of Eq. (12),
the revised version of the inequality Eq. (9), taking into account the fine-tuning consid-
erations F , will be less pronounced than the original inequality, i.e. P F ([λ0]|TM , Bl)
will be less tiny compared with P F ([λ0]|T λ0U , Bl) than P([λ0]|TM , Bl) was compared
with P([λ0]|T λ0U , Bl).
Now the one key assumption on which the new fine-tuning argument for the multi-
verse rests is that the fine-tuning considerations F do not have any further, independent,
impact on our assessment of the two main rival theories’ comparative virtues. Using
Bayesian terminology, this key assumption translates into the statement that the ratio
of the priors P F (TM |Bl) and P F (T λ0U |Bl) assigned after taking into account the
fine-tuning considerations F will not differ markedly from the ratio of the originally
assigned priors P(TM |Bl) and P(T λ0U |Bl), i.e.
P F (TM |Bl)
P F (T λ0U |Bl)
≈ P(TM |Bl)
P(T λ0U |Bl)
. (13)
Arguably, Eq. (13) is a plausible assumption: the fine-tuning considerations F are
about the physico-chemical pre-conditions for the existence of life. These are osten-
sibly unrelated to the systematic virtues and vices of TM and T λ0U based on which the
assignments of the priors P(TM |Bl) and P(T λ0U |Bl) were made. There seems to be
no systematic reason as to why the fine-tuning considerations F would inevitably
privilege T λ0U with respect to TM in any relevant way to be reflected in the pri-
ors.
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If Eq. (13) is assumed, the inequality Eq. (12) encodes the only major shift in
probability assignments when taking the fine-tuning considerations F into account.
Thus we obtain
P F (TM |[λ0], Bl)
P F (T λ0U |[λ0], Bl)
>
P(TM |[λ0], Bl)
P(T λ0U |[λ0], Bl)
, (14)
i.e. the fine-tuning considerations increase our credence in the multiverse theory TM .
Depending on the result of the original competition between TM and T λ0U as encoded
in Eq. (11)—i.e. dependent on whether we had an initially attractive multiverse theory
TM to begin with—and on how pronounced the inequality Eq. (12) is we may end up
with a higher credence in TM than T λ0U . This completes the new fine-tuning argument
for the multiverse.
5 Main Attraction and Limitation of the New Argument
The main attraction of the new fine-tuning argument for the multiverse is that, unlike
the old argument, it is not susceptible to the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge: since
it treats the life-friendliness of our universe as background knowledge rather than as
evidence whose impact we assess, one cannot fault it for failing to consider that the
existence of many other universe would not make it more likely that our universe
is right for life. Another attraction of the new argument in comparison with the old
one is that, whereas the old one required assigning prior probabilities P(TU |B0) and
P(TM |B0) from the curious vantage point of someone who is supposedly unaware
that there is a life-friendly universe, the new one does not do so.
The main limitation of the new argument is its reliance on the assumption that the
fine-tuning considerations F do not (more than minimally) affect the trade-off between
the leading multiverse theory TM and the leading single-universe theory T λ0U inasmuch
as encoded in the assignment of priors P(TM |Bl) and P(T λ0U |Bl). But in the absence
of convincing reasons to doubt this assumption it seems reasonable to suspect that the
fine-tuning considerations may indeed make it rational to at least somewhat increase
our degree of belief in the hypothesis that we live in a multiverse.
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